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Many major corporations and countries have made commitments to
purchase or produce only “sustainable” palm oil, a commodity re-
sponsible for substantial tropical forest loss. Sustainability certifica-
tion is the tool most used to fulfill these procurement policies, and
around 20% of global palm oil production was certified by the
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) in 2017. However, the
effect of certification on deforestation in oil palm plantations re-
mains unclear. Here, we use a comprehensive dataset of RSPO-
certified and noncertified oil palm plantations (∼188,000 km2) in
Indonesia, the leading producer of palm oil, as well as annual re-
motely sensed metrics of tree cover loss and fire occurrence, to
evaluate the impact of certification on deforestation and fire from
2001 to 2015. While forest loss and fire continued after RSPO certi-
fication, certified palm oil was associated with reduced deforesta-
tion. Certification lowered deforestation by 33% from a counterfactual
of 9.8 to 6.6% y−1. Nevertheless, most plantations contained little
residual forest when they received certification. As a result, by 2015,
certified areas held less than 1% of forests remaining within Indo-
nesian oil palm plantations. Moreover, certification had no causal
impact on forest loss in peatlands or active fire detection rates.
Broader adoption of certification in forested regions, strict require-
ments to avoid all peat, and routine monitoring of clearly defined
forest cover loss in certified and RSPO member-held plantations
appear necessary if the RSPO is to yield conservation and climate
benefits from reductions in tropical deforestation.
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil | peatland | quasi-experimental
methods | governance | tropical commodity
Global demand for agricultural and timber commodities hasemerged as the primary driver of tropical deforestation (1).
Reduction of such commodity-driven deforestation supports climate
change mitigation (2, 3), biodiversity preservation (4, 5), air quality
improvements and associated human health outcomes (6), water
quality protection (7), and forest-based livelihoods (8). While state-
sponsored and bilateral programs to address forest loss face several
criticisms and barriers (9), export-oriented supply chains have char-
acteristics that offer novel possibilities for conservation interventions.
Commodity supply chains are often concentrated in the hands of just
a few “lead” firms that exert substantial influence over their suppliers
(10). Recognizing this opportunity, civil society organizations have
pressured commodity and consumer goods companies to alter their
sourcing and production practices to eliminate deforestation.
As a result of these campaigns, by 2017, almost 400 companies
in tropical oil palm, soy, timber, and cattle sectors had adopted
public commitments to more “sustainable” product sourcing
(11). These commitments are lauded by civil society as proof that
market-driven approaches to conservation can benefit forests (3,
12). Indeed, research in South American soy, beef, and forestry
sectors indicates that commitments affect actor behavior within
target supply chains (13) and may reduce deforestation from
commodity production (14–16). Over 55% of these sustainability
commitments reference certification, systems that use third-party
audits to ensure that producers follow a set of social and envi-
ronmental practices to realize their pledges (11). A widely
certified agricultural commodity is palm oil (17), which is pro-
duced mainly in Southeast Asia (18). Companies that produce,
trade, and sell palm oil have adopted certification to signal that
their products are sustainable, and that they have taken steps to
minimize the negative environmental and social impacts linked
to palm oil production (2, 6, 19–22).
About 20% of global 2015 palm oil production was certified by
the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) (17). Certified
oil palm growers agree to comply with the RSPO Principles and
Criteria (P&C) standard, which does not require zero de-
forestation, but limits the land covers that may be developed for
oil palm. Specifically, new plantings since November 2005 may not
clear primary forest or high conservation value (HCV) areas (23).
Certification requires riparian buffer protection, whereas non-
certified plantations sometimes clear to the edge of water bodies
(24). The P&C mandate avoidance of steep slopes and fragile soils,
and ban extensive planting (>100 ha) on peatlands, which have been
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de facto available for development in Southeast Asia (22). In regions
with strict environmental regulations but weak enforcement (17), the
RSPO’s requirements for full legal compliance could restrict which
lands are developed for palm. All certified developments must gain
free, prior, and informed consent from local communities, which
might reduce conversion of community-held lands, including agro-
forests (25). Finally, a requirement to avoid fire use (26) may reduce
accidental forest loss in certified plantations (27).
However, the P&C allow conversion of logged and degraded
forest outside riparian and HCV areas, and do not fully prohibit
peatland development (28). This lack of stringency resulted from
the compromise needed to bridge divergent corporate and civil
society interest groups during the 2013 P&C negotiation (29).
Certified growers are not required to publish HCV area bound-
aries, which prevents remote monitoring of HCV vegetation
change. Moreover, companies planning to seek certification plau-
sibly faced perverse incentives to clear forests before implemen-
tation of the RSPO’s 2010 New Planting Procedure (NPP), which
levies sanctions on growers that undertake development without
an HCV assessment. Due to these issues, and nongovernmental
organization reports questioning the credibility of third-party
auditors (30), the RSPO has been criticized by civil society for
“greenwashing” palm oil grown in recently cleared forests and
drained peatlands (31).
Despite such controversy, the effects of RSPO certification on
forests, including primary, peatland, and other forests protected by
the P&C, remain largely unmeasured (32). Instead, initial research
has focused on fire in Indonesia using recently available plantation
datasets. An assessment of 2012–2015 fire incidence reported sim-
ilar fire rates in RSPO member-held and noncertified plantations
when all soil types and precipitation regimes were considered (26).
Exploring a larger plantation sample, Noojipady et al. (27) reported
fewer fire-associated deforestation events in certified plantations
from 2009 to 2014. While such research informs the degree to
which certified products are associated with fire, these comparisons
were unable to estimate the causal effect of certification on envi-
ronmental outcomes because they evaluated differences over broad
time periods, rather than comparing pre- and postcertification
trends (33, 34). Since certification is voluntary, certified producers
may have sought certification because their practices were already
near compliance with the standard (34), and thus the cause of any
differences may be unrelated to certification. Quasiexperimental
counterfactual analyses aim to address this problem by determining
likely outcomes in the absence of certification. Comparing the
counterfactual with reality enables accurate quantification of certi-
fication’s benefits above and beyond noncertified production (34).
Here, we evaluated the causal impact of RSPO certification on
deforestation, peatland development, and fire activity in Indo-
nesia from 2001 to 2015. In 2014, Indonesia accounted for 40%
of global oil palm harvested area (18) and 44% of RSPO-
certified area (17). We constructed a comprehensive dataset of
certified and noncertified oil palm plantations (35, 36)* (Fig. 1).
Within these plantations, we used annual satellite data products
to track the occurrence of fire (37) and loss of primary forest
(38), peatland forest, and forest areas with >90% tree canopy
cover (excluding tree plantations) (39, 40) (Fig. S1). Propensity
score matching controlled for significant precertification differ-
ences between certified and noncertified plantations (Table S1).
We applied panel models to compare certified and noncertified
plantations from 2000 to 2015. Since data delineating HCV
boundaries, primary forests, riparian buffers, and other lands
targeted for protection under the RSPO standard were un-
available, and the causes of observed burning events were un-
known, our analysis did not evaluate compliance with the RSPO
P&C. For instance, our remotely sensed primary forest dataset
(38) is not necessarily equivalent to primary forest areas identi-
fied during RSPO audits. Instead, our research provides credible
evidence for the impact of RSPO certification on forest pro-
tection and fire reduction.
Results
Adoption of Certification. The first RSPO certificate in Indonesia
was issued in 2009. By January 2017, 7.0% of plantations in our
database were associated with mills that had issued a letter of
intent (LOI) to certify with the RSPO (“certified,” 17,212 km2,
n = 163), which occurred 0.84 ± 0.61 y (mean ± SD) before
gaining certification. Another 9.8% of plantations were held by
RSPO members (22,679 km2, n = 228), and the remainder
belonged to nonmembers (147,676 km2, n = 1,940). The RSPO
does not require full certification of all plantation supply bases
within a specific time frame. Instead, members provide time-
bound plans for full certification and report their progress an-
nually. Once certified, plantations are expected to maintain full
compliance with the P&C. We identified 68 RSPO members with
plantation holdings in Indonesia. Our database contained 59 of
these member companies, with 6.6 ± 6.8 plantations per mem-
ber. Many RSPO members have certified some of their planta-
tions, while others have yet to certify a single plantation. Only 34
RSPO members in our database held any certified plantations
(4.8 ± 5.4 certified plantations per member).
Selection Bias in Patterns of Certification. We observed substantial
selection bias in certification patterns. The mean initial planting
date for certified plantations in Indonesia was 1993. In con-
trast, >50% of 2014 Indonesian oil palm harvested area was
developed after 2003 (18) (Fig. 2A). Only 8.3% of certified
plantations initiated planting from 2005 to 2008, and no plan-
tation with post-2008 initial development was certified by March
of 2017. Because of these differences, certified plantations began
the study period with less forest and more oil palm than non-
certified plantations (Fig. 2 and Table S1). In 2000, certified
plantations collectively contained 12% forest (1,988 km2), 4.0%
primary forest (691 km2), and 40% planted oil palm (6,939 km2),
while noncertified plantations had 36% forest (61,383 km2), 24%
primary forest (41,141 km2), and 6.5% oil palm (11,010 km2).
Sumatra’s certified plantations contained less forest in 2000
(5.3% of plantation area in forest) than those in Kalimantan
(19%). We observed less bias in the colocation of certified
plantations and peatlands. About 13% of certified and 19% of
noncertified plantation area occupied peatlands.
Fig. 1. RSPO-certified and noncertified oil palm plantations. Across Indo-
nesia (light gray), plantation area totaled 187,567 km2 (n = 2,331 planta-
tions). About 53% of the total certified area was in Sumatra (including the
Bangka Belitung Islands, Left), and 47% was in Kalimantan (Indonesian
Borneo, Right).
*Sawit Watch (2013) Palm oil concessions in Indonesia.
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Deforestation and Fire Embodied in Oil Palm Production. The ag-
gregate annual 2000–2015 deforestation rate across all planta-
tions was 3.3% y−1. Deforestation increased from 0.74% y−1 in
2001 to a maximum of 6.5% y−1 in 2012 before falling to 4.0% y−1 in
2015 (Fig. 3A), with similar temporal dynamics for peat and primary
deforestation (Fig. S2). Higher deforestation rates were correlated
with smaller remaining forest areas. Thus, while Kalimantan plan-
tations had a lower aggregate deforestation rate (4.1% y−1) than
Sumatra plantations (7.5% y−1; Fig. S3), total 2000–2015 forest loss in
plantations was greater in Kalimantan (18,439 km2) than Sumatra
(5,451 km2). Active fire rates from 2002 to 2015 averaged 0.078 fire
detections per square kilometer per year. Fire rates in all plantations
were lower from 2007 to 2013 compared with the 2002–2006 and
2014–2015 periods (Fig. 3B).
Most deforestation and fire in certified plantations occurred be-
fore certification. Mean deforestation rates for annual cohorts of
certified plantations peaked about 5 y before LOI publication (Fig. 3
and Fig. S4). Like Noojipady et al. (27), we found high active fire
detection rates in certified plantations from 2002 to 2006 and rela-
tively lower rates since that time (Fig. 3). Deforestation and fires
continued after certification, and are therefore associated with or
“embodied” within certified oil palm products (1). A total of 91 km2
of forest loss (including 24 km2 of peat and 23 km2 of primary forest
loss) and 1,810 active fires were detected in certified plantations after
initiation of the certification process. By 2015, certified plantations
contained just 330 km2 (0.86%) of all remaining 38,286 km2 of forest,
and 80 km2 (0.30%) of remaining primary forest (27,254 km2), in
Indonesian oil palm plantations. Audit reports specify that ≥650 km2
of certified plantations are conservation or HCV lands. The lack of
HCV boundaries prevented assessments of whether forests remain-
ing in certified plantations occurred in HCV areas.
RSPO Certification’s Impact on Forests and Fire. Certification re-
duced deforestation rates by 33%, from a counterfactual mean of
9.8 to 6.6% y−1 (P = 0.028; Fig. 3C and Table S2). Relative to
forest remaining at LOI, simulations indicate that certification
resulted in 21 ± 2.8 km2 of “avoided” deforestation through 2015.
This is equivalent to 23% of the postcertification deforestation, or
6.4% of remaining 2015 forest area, within matched certified plan-
tations. Findings were significant across most alternate matching
methods and models, including matching within administrative
district and RSPO member, and the model did not violate tests of
parallel trends (Tables S2–S4). Only when we applied lower can-
opy cover thresholds of 30% or 60% to define “forest” did we
detect no significant effect of certification on deforestation (Table
S4). Deforestation reductions were driven mainly by dynamics
within Kalimantan plantations, where certification reduced de-
forestation by 40% (P < 0.001). In Sumatra, certification was as-
sociated with reduced forest loss, but this effect was not significant
(P = 0.57; Fig. S3 and Table S4).
Certification had a large but less significant effect on primary
forests, where it reduced deforestation by 36% (P = 0.053; Fig. S2
and Table S2). Our main statistical model yielded no evidence for a
causal effect of certification on peatland forest clearing (P = 0.50;
Fig. S2 and Table S2). Although the main model indicated that
certification may have reduced fire rates (P = 0.081; Fig. 3D and
Table S2), temporal trends in fire rates for certified and noncertified
plantations were not similar before certification, a violation of the
parallel trends assumption (Tables S3 and S5). This led us to reject
the hypothesis that certification had a causal effect on fire rates.
Despite reductions in deforestation after certification, certi-
fied plantations lost 84% (1,657 km2) of their year 2000 forest
cover by 2015, while noncertified plantations in the filtered
A
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Fig. 2. Differences between RSPO-certified and noncertified oil palm
plantations in Indonesia. Compared with noncertified plantations, certified
plantations were older (A, planting year), with more planted oil palm (B,
percentage of plantation in oil palm in 2000) and less forest (C, percentage
of plantation in forest in 2000). (D) Certified plantations lost more year
2000 forests by 2008 than noncertified areas (percentage of year 2000 for-
ests lost, 2001–2008). (E) Peatland proportion (percentage of plantation in
peatland) was similar in certified and noncertified plantations. Plots depict
kernel density estimates of the values for all plantations in the category,
including median (center lines) and interquartile range (dashed lines).
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Fig. 3. Temporal trends in deforestation and fire within Indonesian oil palm
plantations. (A and B) Unmatched rates of deforestation and fire in RSPO-
certified, to be certified, and noncertified plantations. (C and D) Matched
rates of deforestation and fire in RSPO-certified and noncertified plantations
as a function of years to certification for the certified sample. (E and F) Mean
difference in deforestation or fire between RSPO-certified and noncertified
plantations. Rates are per plantation, averaged across all plantations in the
group. Matched figures in C–F represent within-island matching through
2008. Noncertified statistics in matched figures in C–F were calculated using
synthetic control plantations. The vertical dashed line represents certifica-
tion initiation, and shading indicates 95% confidence intervals.
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unmatched plantation sample (Matching and Subsetting) lost only
38% (23,428 km2). This effect was due to higher precertification
deforestation rates in certified plantations compared with non-
certified counterparts. Around 97% of deforestation in certified
plantations occurred before LOI submission. Our main models
treated this precertification difference as selection bias, and
sought to minimize this bias by matching deforestation rates
through 2008. This difference could instead be evidence of an-
ticipatory behavior, in which companies seeking certification
shifted deforestation to the precertification period. We explored
potential for such anticipation through models that matched
through 2003, the year before RSPO formation (Tables S5 and
S6). These models indicated a 36% deforestation increase 4–8 y
before certification (P = 0.02) and a 20% decrease in post-
certification deforestation (P = 0.29; Fig. 4 and Table S6).
Discussion
Certification’s Impact on Forests. Our models suggest that RSPO
certification reduced deforestation in high tree cover areas and
primary forests compared with similar noncertified plantations.
As a result, certified plantations retained more forest relative to
the amount of forest present when the LOI was issued. De-
forestation reductions were particularly large within primary
forests, areas targeted for protection by the P&C. Previous work
indicates that such forests provide several important ecosystem
services, including retention of biodiversity and carbon storage
(4, 41). Our finding that certification leads to 33% reduced de-
forestation is similar to research in the logging, timber planta-
tion, and coffee sectors that found significant reductions in
deforestation of 2–25% due to third-party certification (16, 42).
Our result contrasts with work that found no effect of coffee or
logging certification on forest loss (43–46). Thus, RSPO certifi-
cation appears to be at least as effective as similar certification
systems at reducing deforestation.
Nevertheless, certified plantations incurred some deforestation,
including in primary and peatland forests. After certification, mean
deforestation rates remained high at 6.6% y−1, and plantations lost
91 km2 of forest. Since RSPO members were bound by HCV and
primary forest conversion rules from November 2005 onward, this
observed deforestation was either allowable under the P&C or
occurred in violation of the P&C and should be compensated via
the RSPO’s Remediation and Compensation Procedure (47).
Moreover, certification had no impact on deforestation in lower
tree cover areas. While these areas may be considered forest by the
government of Indonesia (38, 48), they could have been logged,
burned, or part of agroforestry or shifting agricultural systems (49),
and were thus less likely to be considered HCV or primary forest
by auditors. While certification had no significant impact on de-
forestation in peatlands, small sample sizes in peatland models
limited our power to detect any such effects (Table S2).
The significant impact of certification on deforestation in
Kalimantan, but not Sumatra, suggests that the context in which
certification occurs matters. Upon LOI publication, Sumatra
plantations contained just 1.4% forest versus 3.2% in Kali-
mantan plantations. Potential forest protection through certifi-
cation was thus lower in Sumatra, and any effect of certification
may have been undetectable due to inaccuracies in our geo-
spatial datasets. This result supports recommendations to target
supply chain interventions to high-risk locations, rather than
regions where producers can easily meet standards (17).
Our incorporation of time-varying effects advanced previous ap-
proaches used to evaluate interactions between certification and
deforestation (16, 42–46), and allowed us to examine behaviors that
tend to occur before and after certification. Temporal trends in
treatment effects suggested that deforestation in certified plantations
was higher before certification (Fig. 4 and Table S5). This dynamic
could indicate temporally varying differences between certified and
noncertified areas. Specifically, in some cases, LOI submission may
signal a newly operational mill and completion of plantation devel-
opment. Models that matched through 2003 did not control for dif-
fering plantation development trajectories from 2004 to certification.
Alternatively, we speculate that companies seeking certification may
have increased their precertification forest clearing with the un-
derstanding that such activity would be restricted after the initiation
of the certification process. Whether strategically motivated or not,
over time, elevated precertification deforestation may be offset by the
postcertification decrease in deforestation (Fig. 4 and Tables S5 and
S6). If RSPO-certified growers protect remaining forests while de-
forestation continues in noncertified areas, the relative benefits of
certification for forests may increase with time since certification.
Fire and the RSPO. Like Noojipady et al. (27), we found that RSPO-
certified plantations had substantially lower fire rates than non-
certified plantations in the post-2009 period. However, this dif-
ference in fire incidence rates developed multiple years before
certification, invalidating causal claims that certification reduced
fire occurrence (Fig. 3C, Fig. S4, and Tables S1 and S5). Although
we matched plantations with similar fire histories and controlled
for interannual variations in temperature and precipitation (50),
we did not assess certification’s effects specifically during wet years
with lower fire risk, when previous work suggests that certification
is associated with reduced fire rates (26).
Potential Drivers of Nonforest Bias. Consistent with incentive structures
facing oil palm producers, we found strong bias toward certification
of plantations with little remaining forest. Some drivers of this bias
are unlikely to affect the degree of forest protection conferred by the
RSPO. For instance, RSPO rules oblige plantations to have an op-
erational mill to certify, which means that they (or their suppliers)
must develop enough plantation area to support the mill before
certification. While principle 7 of the P&C is designed to ensure that
HCV areas and primary forests remain unconverted, other forest
types (i.e., areas with high tree cover, such as agroforests, that are
potentially allowable for conversion under the P&C) are likely to be
cleared before certification. Moreover, in our evaluation of time-
bound plans, RSPO member companies in Indonesia with un-
certified supply bases certified an average of 0.87 plantations per
year. Companies typically proceeded in chronological order, such that
the oldest plantations, which are least likely to contain forest, were
certified first. This bias may diminish as RSPO members certify all
their plantations.
Other sources of bias could restrict the ability of RSPO certi-
fication to significantly affect industry-wide deforestation rates.
Indonesian regulations require that companies use 100% of their
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Fig. 4. Temporal trends in deforestation (defor.) and remaining forest in
RSPO-certified and noncertified oil palm plantations in Indonesia matched
through 2003. The deforestation rate (A), mean difference in deforestation
rate between RSPO-certified and noncertified matched samples (B), and
percentage of remaining forests relative to year 2000 (C) were derived from
samples matched through 2003. Noncertified statistics were calculated using
synthetic control plantations. The vertical dashed line represents certifica-
tion initiation, and shading indicates 95% confidence intervals.
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leased arable land area, including forested lands, for plantation
activities (51). Thus, RSPO members in Indonesia may avoid ac-
quiring high forest cover areas, or excise forests from land leases,
to avoid the conflict between legality and sustainability. Second,
recently developed and undeveloped leases are subject to the
Remediation and Compensation Procedure and/or the NPP.
Certifying these areas likely incurs high audit and compliance costs
(52), which could dissuade companies that hold leases with ex-
tensive forests from joining the RSPO. Finally, pressure by civil
society on the palm oil sector seeks to eliminate deforestation
from corporate supply chains (12). Given the cost of managing
forested landscapes (53), and the negative impact on reputational
risk if forest within plantations is lost (3), companies with sus-
tainable supply chain goals may prefer to develop nonforest areas
or excise forested areas from their land banks rather than protect
HCV areas. Such selective plantation establishment is unlikely to
influence currently certified plantations, since 91% initiated de-
velopment before RSPO founding in 2004.
Contribution to Transparency. While the plantation dataset pre-
sented here is the most comprehensive accounting of oil palm
concessions currently available for Indonesia, the noncertified data
contain omissions, commission errors, and incomplete identifica-
tion of RSPO member-held concessions. Inaccuracies result from
Indonesia’s complex land enclosure processes, lack of a complete and
centralized government concession database, and a culture of secrecy
surrounding corporate land transactions (54). Our matching pro-
cedure likely reduced the influence of such inaccuracies on analytical
outcomes. However, if plantations were omitted nonrandomly, or if
RSPOmember-held plantations are sold and never gain certification,
this would bias our results. In contrast, our certified plantation da-
tabase included 81% of all Indonesian plantations certified by Jan-
uary 2017. By publishing audit reports with plantation boundaries, the
RSPO demands more transparency from growers than is the norm.
Accurate plantation boundaries provide the basis for public scrutiny,
and the possibility to assess certification’s impacts. We still lack data
on lands, like HCV areas, “off-limits” for development. Such data
would support ongoing monitoring, verification, and enforcement of
the P&C as they relate to land cover.
Conclusion
RSPO certification provides an indicator to guide customers
toward palm oil purchases associated with lower recent loss of
high tree cover and primary forests, as well as fire incidence. We
found that lower deforestation embodied in certified products
resulted largely from certification that skewed toward plantations
with few remaining forests. The significant impact of certification on
deforestation indicates that higher levels of certification could gen-
erate greater forest protection.
The RSPO is under pressure to meet recent pledges by corpo-
rations and oil palm-importing countries to source only de-
forestation, and peat-free, palm oil (11). To enable compliance with
such procurement policies, the RSPO would need to develop a
clear definition of “deforestation” that can be monitored using re-
mote sensing (27, 55). Remote monitoring (56) of conservation set-
asides, supported by ground-truth assessments, could demonstrate
compliance. The P&C would need to be revised to require that
certified supply bases were not developed from peatlands and areas
defined as forest. However, such changes would likely increase
certification’s cost, which threatens to exclude producers, especially
small- and medium-size growers, from the RSPO (17). If mem-
bership stays stagnant or declines, the RSPO’s impact on forest
conservation and other critical sustainability concerns in the oil
palm sector (e.g., workers’ safety, water pollution) may decrease.
Currently, the RSPO NEXT standard (57) allows producers that
wish to meet zero deforestation commitments to become certified
as no deforestation, no peat, and no fire. Such tiered standards may
be preferable if the goal is to retain and gain RSPO members.
Our research indicates that palm oil producers currently have
few incentives to expand the area of forest under their control.
Thus, it is difficult to align individual corporate decisions with
broader conservation goals, such as halting tropical deforestation
(53). Positive incentives for forest protection, such as a price
premium linked to forest conservation, may increase forest area
preserved through certification. With around 20% of all global
palm oil now certified (17), the RSPO has great potential to in-
fluence tropical land cover change. Whether roundtable members
embrace higher levels of stringency and transparency around land
use change, and how such changes might affect incentives for
RSPO membership, will determine palm oil certification’s con-
tribution to tropical forest conservation.
Methods
Plantation Boundaries and Planted Oil Palm. The RSPO secretariat supplied
polygon vector data that outlined the boundaries of 134 of RSPO-certified
supply bases worldwide. We digitized additional polygons from maps avail-
able from audit reports hosted on the RSPO website, and supplemented these
with plantation boundaries provided in annual communications of progress
(ACOPs). For noncertified plantations, we used oil palm concession leases (35)*
supplemented with RSPO member-held noncertified concessions from ACOPs.
We identified noncertified, RSPO member-held plantations by comparing
company names from this database with names of RSPO member subsidiary
companies. The noncertified dataset overlapped substantially with certified
polygons, and we reconciled these geodatabases by modifying overlapping
areas. Planted oil palm was derived from maps developed through manual
digitization of plantations from satellite data (2, 40). Plantations in our dataset
occurred across Indonesian regions, including Kalimantan, Sumatra, Papua,
Sulawesi, the Riau Islands, the Maluku Islands, Nusa Tenggara, and Java.
Forest Cover Loss and Fire Occurrence. We aligned our forest loss outcome
metrics as closely as possible with those in the RSPO certification system. We
used 2001–2015 Landsat satellite-derived deforestation, defined as a stand-
replacement disturbance or the complete removal of tree canopy cover, to
assess deforestation, and primary and peatland forest loss (39). Since tree
plantations may be indistinguishable from intact forest based on forest
canopy cover (25, 49), we excluded areas identified as plantation and mixed
tree crop from deforestation assessments (2, 40). We define forest as hav-
ing >90% tree cover in 2000 (39). We chose this threshold to exclude
agroforests, secondary forest regrowth, and other lower forest cover lands
from deforestation metrics (49). This is particularly important in Indonesia,
where agroforests, forest-like fallows, jungle rubber, pulp and paper, and oil
palm have high canopy cover but are not targeted for conservation under
the P&C (17). Sensitivity analyses explored the effects of alternate forest
definitions (30% and 60% forest cover) on outcomes (Table S4). To evaluate
the impact of certification on primary forest loss, we quantified tree cover
loss (39) in areas of “primary forest,” mature natural forest of ≥5 ha
retaining natural composition and structure (38). We assessed the degree to
which certified plantations were located on peat (58–60) and quantified
forest cover loss in peatlands. We used the MODIS global monthly fire lo-
cation product (MOD14 v6) to identify locations of active fire (37). To gen-
erate annual fire rates (fire detections per square kilometer per year) from
2002 to 2015, we summed annual fire detections in each plantation and
divided by plantation area.
Econometric Models. To minimize selection bias (33, 61), we combined
matching and panel methods (62). Matching methods control for observed
differences (e.g., past fire rates) between certified and noncertified plan-
tations before certification. Panel methods control for time-invariant char-
acteristics of the plantation (e.g., ownership) and temporally varying shocks
to the system (e.g., drought). Lagged models considered all plantations that
have issued LOIs, including those not yet certified as of 2016, as “treated.”
We first excluded plantations with <1 km2 of forest cover or >99% coverage
by timber, rubber, oil palm, or other plantations in 2000. This eliminated all
certified plantations outside of Kalimantan and Sumatra. We then calcu-
lated propensity scores for the remaining plantations using several observ-
able characteristics (Table S1). Using these propensity scores, we matched
certified plantations to similar noncertified plantations within Indonesian
regions (i.e., Kalimantan and Sumatra). Alternate matching specifications
constrained matches to fall within the same district or company. Next, we
used a Poisson model with year and plantation fixed effects to quantify the
average effect of certification on certified plantations (Tables S2, S5, and S6).
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We tested the robustness of our results against several alternate functional
forms, definitions of deforestation, and geographic subregions (Table S4).
We also tested the second-stage model’s assumption of parallel trends
among certified and noncertified plantations (Table S3).
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